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THE UNIMPORTANCE OF PRECEDENT IN THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS
Michael Wells*
INTRODUCTION
If we are fully to understand any area of the law, we must do more than
master the rules and the policy considerations underpinning them. Quite
apart from the content of the law, as manifested in holdings and policies,
the process by which decisions are reached also deserves attention. For
example, some bodies of law emphasize precise rules, while others are
comprised mainly of broad standards. The jury makes many decisions in
some areas of the law and few or none in others. Some areas remain far
more stable over time than others. In particular, it seems to me that the law
of federal courts appears more prone to rapid change than most doctrinal
landscapes. In this Article, I offer some examples to support my intuition
that precedent is a comparatively weak restraint in federal courts cases, and
I argue that this feature of federal courts doctrine is a consequence of the
interplay between certain fundamental features of stare decisis and the kinds
of issues addressed by the law of federal courts.
Throughout this inquiry, it is essential to distinguish between two kinds
of criticism of a judicial decision. One addresses its content and the other
its form.' Someone may object to the wisdom of a ruling or the political
values it implements, fearing that the court's approach will diminish liberty,
encourage waste, or in some other way do more harm than good. In federal
courts law, for example, critics may debate the proper scope of standing for
generalized grievances, the best approach to Supreme Court review of am-
biguous state judgments, or the extent of the states' eleventh amendment
immunity from suit in federal court. Alternatively, a critic might focus on
the methods by which the court reached its conclusion, questioning the
court's allegiance to traditional formal restraints on the exercise of judicial
power, such as submission to legislative will, decision according to rule, and
respect for prior cases. Justices Brennan and Stevens advanced this kind of
objection in their dissents in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State2 and Pennhurst State School &
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. The author thanks Dan Coenen, Paul LeBel,
and Fred Schauer for their helpful comments on a draft of this article.
I. See Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J.
LEG. STUD. 351, 355 (1973).
2. 454 U.S. 464, 491-515 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Hospital v. Halderman,3 when they took the Supreme Court to task for
disregarding precedent.4
Because the content of the law is of more immediate practical importance
than the courts' methodology, most scholarly commentary concentrates on
the substantive merits of legal rules. The elaboration of concepts like stare
decisis is left to legal philosophers. Quite naturally, the analysis of precedent
proceeds in highly abstract terms, with little systematic attention to specific
doctrinal contexts. In the process we may come to think of precedent as a
monolithic concept, consistent in its force regardless of domain, and to
overlook the possibility that the role of prior cases in adjudication may vary
from one context to another. This Article sets aside concern with the content
of federal courts law in order to examine stare decisis in this doctrinal
category. My hope is that such an inquiry may advance our understanding
of both the law of federal courts and the concept of precedent.
Part I of this Article asserts that the Supreme Court pays little attention
to precedent in federal courts law. My examples in support of this claim are
taken from important areas of federal courts doctrine, where two major
upheavals have taken place in the past thirty years. First, the Warren Court
rewrote the law to expand access to federal court. Then under Chief Justice
Burger, the Court undid many of the changes wrought by its predecessor.
The discussion in Part I of prominent departures from precedent is not
offered as decisive proof that stare decisis is less important in federal courts
cases than elsewhere. It is instead an account of the grounds for my intuition
that this is so. I do not know how to go about empirically proving the point,
short of developing a means of precisely measuring the importance of
precedent in various areas, and then persuading the world to accept my
methodology. I am not up to that task.
Part II examines the concept of precedent in general terms. Borrowing
from the jurisprudential literature on stare decisis, I argue that precedent is
best viewed as a means and not an end in itself. Adherence to prior cases
is a way to pursue a number of goals, including predictability in the law,
efficiency in decisionmaking, and fairness to litigants. These worthy goals
come at a price, for a court that chooses precedent as its rule of decision
necessarily foregoes the opportunity to improve the content of the law by
reexamining the arguments on the merits of the legal question at hand.
Part III considers the implications of this cost-benefit approach to prec-
edent for federal courts law. The values of predictability, efficiency, and
fairness carry great weight in cases where the legal rules bear heavily on
primary behavior and the substantive law of rights and obligations. But they
are not particularly strong in the law of federal courts, where the issue is
typically the distribution of decisionmaking power between federal and state
courts and among courts and other governmental institutions. A court bent
3. 465 U.S. 89, 125-67 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 159-62; 454 U.S. at 510-13.
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on reforming the law will always find it comparatively easy to justify a
departure from precedent in federal courts law. In addition, the costs of
adhering to precedent here are substantial. Although federal courts doctrine
rarely bears directly on the substantive law of rights and obligations, it does
address important questions of governmental structure. It is concerned with
the institutional role of the federal courts in our system of government.
Fidelity to precedent would impose a high cost on Supreme Court Justices,
for it would oblige them to pass up the opportunity to contribute to the
development of law on these vital matters. As a result of this combination
of factors, the Supreme Court will find, more often than courts do in other
areas of the law, that the costs of following precedent are especially high
and the benefits especially low in the adjudication of federal courts issues.
This argument is not offered in defense of the Supreme Court's low regard
for precedent. Rather, it is an effort to describe and explain the Court's
practice, and thereby enhance the understanding of federal courts doctrine.
When I speak of the foregone opportunity to improve the law as a cost of
fidelity to precedent, I do not mean that rejecting the prior case will
necessarily improve the law, only that the court faced with the choice may
perceive the issue in those terms. Whether the precedent or the proposed
solution is the better rule in any given case will often depend on the political
values one brings to this judgment. It is no accident that conservative Justices
were the strongest supporters of strict adherence to precedent against the
onslaught of the Warren Court in the 1960's, while the liberal majority of
those years gave short shrift to stare decisis.5 Nor is it surprising that
contemporary conservatives tend to be partisans of a weak precedential
constraint, while today's liberals complain about the Court's disrespect for
prior cases.
6
I. CHRONIC INSTABILITY IN THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
Supreme Court decisions on jurisdictional issues typically give short shrift
to stare decisis. The Court seldom flatly overrules an earlier decision. Rather,
it manifests disrespect for precedent by drawing untenable distinctions be-
tween its holding and the prior case. The upshot is a pattern of chronic
5. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Mapp
Court overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ("In overruling the Wolf case the Court,
in my opinion, has forgotten the sense of judicial restraint which, without due regard for stare
decisis, is one element that should enter into deciding whether a past decision of this Court
should be overruled."). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 525-26 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 518 (1959) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam). The
Patterson Court decided to rehear Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), without the
request of the parties. In their dissent, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens
argued that the Court was acting in disregard of stare decisis in so deciding.
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instability over a wide range of federal courts issues. 7 In support of this
assertion the ensuing sections offer a number of illustrations from important
areas of federal courts doctrine. In each instance, the analysis focuses not
on the merit of the Court's ruling, but solely on its treatment of precedent.
A. Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal courts to hearing
"cases." 8 The central inquiry in determining whether a particular dispute is
a "case" is the parties' standing to raise the issues which they seek to
litigate.9 Only if the plaintiff has suffered a "distinct and palpable" injury
as a result of the claimed illegality will he or she be permitted to litigate. 0
Many constitutional rights are held in common by the population as a whole,
so that no one suffers any specific and distinct harm from a constitutional
violation, while everyone can plausibly claim a violation of abstract consti-
tutional rights. Examples include the first amendment right against an es-
tablishment of religion," the directive in the accounts clause that government
budgets be made public,"2 and the prohibition in the incompatibility clause
on service in the armed forces by members of Congress. 3
7. Cf. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 683,
684 (1981) ("the more one studies federal jurisdiction, the more forcefully one must conclude
that much uncertainty surrounds the decision of many jurisdictional issues. In many cases ...
federal jurisdictional rules are extraordinarily unclear. They are also extremely complex. And
it is not obvious what policies the complexities fulfill.").
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizen thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). Note that "[tihe term 'standing' subsumes a blend of
constitutional requirements and prudential considerations" and the Court's opinions often leave
unclear the pedigree of particular rules. Id.
10. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (the Court held that the plaintiffs did not
have standing against the defendant town in a suit challenging the town's housing ordinances
that prohibited persons of low or moderate income from living there).
11. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1968) (the plaintiffs had standing because they
could show that their tax money was being spent in religious schools).
12. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167-68 (1974) (the plaintiff did not have
standing because there was no logical nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the failure of
Congress to require a detailed accounting of expenditures from the CIA).
13. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (the plaintiff
could not prove a logical nexus between being a member of the Armed Forces Reserve and the
nonobservance of the incompatibility clause by members of Congress who were also Reserve
members).
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Who, if anyone, should be permitted to litigate such claims? In Froth-
ingham v. Mellon14 the Supreme Court held them nonjusticiable. 15 A federal
taxpayer sought to strike down a federal statute appropriating funds to
provide health care for mothers and their babies. She claimed that the statute
was unconstitutional because Congress' spending power' 6 did not extend to
such matters. The alleged injury was the appropriation of the plaintiff's
taxes for this illegal purpose. The Court found the injury too insubstantial
to support the litigation, since the taxpayer's interest in the federal treasury
"is shared with millions of others [and] is comparatively minute and inde-
terminate, 11 7 and because the effect of a congressional expenditure on
anyone's tax liability is "remote, fluctuating, and uncertain."'" . Since the
federal taxpayer suffers no "direct injury,"' 19 adjudicating her claim "would
be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority
over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department."
20
Frothingham kept these generalized grievance cases out of the courts for
almost fifty years, until the Warren Court's decision granting standing in
Flast v. Cohen.2' In Flast, a federal taxpayer challenged a congressional
spending program that provided aid to parochial schools, claiming that the
expenditure violated the establishment clause. Despite the decision in Froth-
ingham, the Court allowed the lawsuit. At the same time, it denied any
break with precedent. Flast differed from Frothingham in that the plaintiffs
here based their challenge on a specific constitutional limitation on the
spending power and not on the general strictures of article 1.22
This distinction is a lame response to the argument from precedent. Stare
decisis would be a toothless constraint if it only applied when a court could
find no difference between the earlier cases and the later one, for "[nlo two
events are exactly alike." ' 23 What matters is whether the two cases are alike
14. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). For developments before Frothingham, see Nichol, Standing on
the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. REv. 798, 803-04 & nn. 47-
48 (1983).
15. 262 U.S. at 480, 488.
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States .... Id.
17. 262 U.S. at 487.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 488.
20. Id. at 489. See also Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam) (the plaintiff's
motion claiming that the appointment of Mr. Justice Black to the Supreme Court was null and
void because there was no vacancy when he was appointed was denied as the plaintiff did not
suffer a direct injury).
21. 392 U.S. 83, 103-06 (1968). Cf. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (the
Court reached the merits of an establishment clause claim without addressing the standing
problem).
22. 392 U.S. at 101-06.
23. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 577 (1987).
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in terms of the reasoning and scope of the prior ruling.24 The Court, in
Flast, draws a distinction where there is no real difference. Suppose a court
holds that contributory negligence should be an absolute defense in tort
cases.25 The court makes this ruling in a case where the plaintiff drove his
car too fast at night on a wet, curving road. A later court that prefers
comparative negligence cannot legitimately distinguish the earlier decision by
pointing out that here the plaintiff ran a red light.
In terms of the reasoning of Frothingham and the scope of the rule
announced in that case, it makes no difference whether the constitutional
claim is based on a general or specific constitutional standard. The focus is
upon the insubstantial nature of the taxpayer's interest, and in this respect
there is no discernible difference between Frothingham and Flast.26 The
Court's proffered distinction between the taxpayer's interest in rectifying
violations of the establishment clause and his interest in challenging other
kinds of government action "reduces constitutional standing to a word game
played by secret rules." ' 27 Let me stress that this point about the Court's
break with precedent is quite independent of the question whether Flast lays
down a good rule.
Now consider the fate of Flast at the hands of the Burger Court. Flast
justified its taxpayer standing rule by stressing the special nature of the
establishment clause. "One of the specific evils" feared by the framers "was
that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over
another or to support religion in general." '2 Unlike the general limits on the
spending power that the plaintiff in Frothingham sought to raise, the estab-
lishment clause "was designed as a specific bulwark against . . . potential
abuses of governmental power," and. the clause "operates as a specific
constitutional limitation" upon Congress' article I taxing and spending
power.
29
In Valley Forge Christian College,30 the Burger Court abandoned the
special status accorded establishment clause claims under Flast.3' The Court
denied standing to taxpayers who sought to prevent the Secretary of Edu-
cation from transferring government property to a religious college at no
cost. Valley Forge resurrected the reasoning of Frothingham2 and distin-
24. See Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 172-81
(1930); Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REv. 117, 119 (1959); Schauer,
supra note 23, at 577-78. Cf. M. EISENBERO, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 136 (1988)
(on the use of "inconsistent distinctions" as a means of undermining established doctrines).
25. The substantive basis for such a ruling may be that the absolute defense gives better
incentives for safety than does comparative negligence.
26. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 121-30 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 129 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 103.
29. Id. at 104; see also id. at 115-16 (Fortas, J., concurring).
30. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
31. Id. at 488-89.
32. Id. at 471, 477, 489-90.
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guished Flast as a case where the plaintiffs challenged congressional action.
Here, in contrast, an executive officer of the government made the transfer.33
Moreover, Congress did not enact the authorizing legislation under its taxing
and spending power. Rather, it "was an evident exercise of Congress' power
under the Property Clause."
'3 4
Once again, the Court seized upon an insubstantial distinction. Under the
reasoning of Flast, what counts is the special nature of the establishment
clause as a bulwark against government aid to religion. It is irrelevant whether
Congress or an executive officer takes the challenged action, or whether the
statutory authority comes from article I or article IV of the Constitution.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the Court's "tenuous
distinction"3 5 serves "only to trivialize the standing doctrine.
'3 6
B. Pennhurst and the Scope of the Eleventh Amendment
The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." '3 7 Ever since Ex parte
Young" was decided in 1908, the Court has permitted suits for injunctive
relief against state officers who act unconstitutionally, on the ground that
the state officer is "stripped of his official or representative character and
is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct." 3 9
Efforts to delineate the proper scope of the Ex parte Young exception have
produced an unstable body of doctrine. This section discusses a recent and
dramatic departure from precedent in the area.
In the wake of Ex parte Young, plaintiffs sought relief in federal court
against state governments on both federal and state law grounds. In Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 40 which reached the Supreme Court just a
year after Ex parte Young, the railroad attacked ceilings on freight rates as
illegal under state law, as well as the federal due process clause. 4' A deter-
mination that the ceilings on freight rates violated state law would render it
unnecessary to resolve the fourteenth amendment claim. Therefore, the Court
33. Id. at 479.
34. Id. at 480 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.)
35. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 514 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For another recent example of doctrinal instability
in standing law, compare Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1973) (granting standing
to black parents seeking to challenge government aid to segregated private schools, even though
it was uncertain whether the remedy sought would actually further integration) with Allen v.
Wright, 418 U.S. 717 (1984) (denying standing in such a case). See Nichol, Abusing Standing:
A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 639-40 & n.26 (1985).
37. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
38. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
39. Id. at 160.
40. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
41. Id. at 177.
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directed the lower federal courts to first attempt to resolve such cases on
state law grounds, so as to avoid the friction between courts and legislatures
that accompanies the adjudication of constitutional issues. 42 In Siler, the
Supreme Court itself relied on state law to give the railroad the relief it
requested. 43
Whether a federal court should enjoin state officers on state grounds may
pose an eleventh amendment issue distinct from relief on federal grounds,
for the decision in Ex parte Young is somewhat ambiguous. On its face, Ex
parte Young holds that the officer who acts illegally is not a state actor and
hence is not entitled to the state's immunity." It follows that the exception
to the eleventh amendment recognized in Ex parte Young embraces relief
based on state, as well as federal law. But the case may also be read as a
judicially created exception to the eleventh amendment, justified by the need
to craft effective federal remedies for fourteenth amendment violations.
The Court in Siler evidently took the former view of Ex parte Young, for
it did not address the potential immunity issue lurking in the background.
Were this not the Court's commonly held understanding of Ex parte Young,
then surely Justice Harlan, who dissented in the earlier case, would have
raised the issue. Yet Justice Harlan joined a unanimous Court in Siler .45
In 1984, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman46 held that the
eleventh amendment bars federal relief against state officers on state law
grounds . 4  Here the Court chose to read Ex parte Young" as a tool for
enforcing fourteenth amendment rights and disowned Siter.49 The plaintiffs
in Pennhurst were inmates at a state mental hospital who claimed they had
received inadequate treatment in violation of the federal constitution, federal
statutes, and state law.50 Although the facts were different, the analytical
structure of their suit was identical to Siler. At an early stage of the litigation
the lower federal courts granted relief based on federal statutory provisions,"
but the Supreme Court read the statutes differently and reversed on the
merits. The Court remanded with instructions to consider whether state law
would give the plaintiffs the relief they sought . 2 The terms of the remand
were wholly unexceptional, typical of federal practice ever since Siler. Yet
when the district court found a basis in state law for the plaintiffs' claim,
42. Id. at 193.
43. Id. at 193-98.
44. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
45. 213 U.S. at 190.
46. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
47. Id. at 124-25.
48. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
49. 465 U.S. at 117-21.
50. Id. at 92.
51. Id. at 93. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 884 (3d Cir.
1979) (en banc); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314-24
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
52. 451 U.S. 1, 31 & n.24 (1981).
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the Court abruptly announced that the relief violated the eleventh amend-
ment.
The Court justified its departure from precedent by stressing that the Siler
opinion failed to address the eleventh amendment issue presented by relief
on state grounds.53 There is merit in the precept that the precedential value
of a case depends in part on the care with which the precedent-setting court
addressed the matter in question. If the issue received little or no attention,
a later court might well be justified in giving it a second look. But Siler is
a singularly inappropriate case for such a reexamination. The likely reason
the Siler Court did not explicitly address the eleventh amendment issue is
that it thought it had already done so a year before in Ex parte Young.
From the perspective of the unanimous Siler Court, the important feature
of Siler was the opportunity it provided to try to minimize friction between
the federal courts and state governments.
The longevity of Siler and the federal courts' repeated adherence to that
decision should also count for something.5 4 The lower courts, with the explicit
approval of the Supreme Court, had followed Siler for seventy-five years.
A large part of the value of precedent lies in the goal of maintaining stability
in the law. Once the Siler rule was established, it became unimportant from
the standpoint of stability that the Court had failed to address the eleventh
amendment issue identified by the Pennhurst majority. Nothing is more
disruptive of settled expectations than the sudden repudiation of a long-
standing and well known rule, however shaky its doctrinal foundations may
be. 55
C. Comity and Federalism
Ex parte Young holds that constitutional challenges to state action may
be brought in federal court, despite the eleventh amendment, provided that
53. 465 U.S. at 118-19.
54. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2217-18 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("the respect accorded prior decisions increases ... with their antiquity, as the society adjusts
itself to their existence, and the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity.").
55. In contrast, I do not regard Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), as a serious break
with precedent, even though it overruled Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), which,
in turn, had ignored Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945). Ford
Motor refused, on eleventh amendment grounds, to allow a federal suit for a refund of illegally
collected state taxes. Id. at 464. Shapiro, without citing either Ford Motor or the eleventh
amendment, permitted the plaintiffs to recover from the state those illegally withheld welfare
benefits. 394 U.S. at 621-42. Edelman, decided five years later, expressly overruled Shapiro.
415 U.S. at 670-71. In my view, Shapiro had little precedential weight as an eleventh amendment
holding, not only because the Court failed to address the eleventh amendment issue, but also
because it had not earned the respect of lower federal courts. See Rothstein v. Wyman, 467
F.2d 226, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973).
Another recent repudiation of precedent in eleventh amendment law is Welch v. State Dep't
of Highways and Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (overruling Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S.
184 (1964)).
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the plaintiff seeks only prospective relief.16 The Supreme Court has erected
a number of other obstacles to federal relief, in the form of abstention,
exhaustion, and default rules." Two of these, abstention and procedural
default in habeas corpus, provide good illustrations of the Court's charac-
teristic willingness to break with precedent in adjudicating federal courts
issues.
1. Abstention in Constitutional Cases
State criminal statutes sometimes penalize words and actions that are
arguably protected by the first amendment or other constitutional provisions,
such as statutes that forbid subversive advocacy" and statutes that set ceilings
on railroad freight rates.5 9 The first may violate freedom of speech, and the
second may run afoul of the due process clause. Persons who object to these
statutes or their application typically prefer to litigate the constitutional issue
in a federal court suit modeled after Ex parte Young. State prosecutors
prefer to try these constitutional questions in state criminal courts. The
problem for the Supreme Court is to devise rules for allocating such cases
between federal and state courts.
In Douglas v. City of Jeannette6O a group of Jehovah's Witnesses wanted
to distribute religious literature door-to-door without first obtaining a city
license. When the city threatened to prosecute them in state court, they
initiated a federal suit for injunctive relief, claiming the ordinance violated
the establishment clause. The Supreme Court, writing in the post-New Deal
heyday of deference to state courts, took a narrow view of the federal courts'
role in such cases and denied a federal forum to these plaintiffs. "[Tihe
arrest by the federal courts of the processes of the criminal law within the
states ... [is] to be supported only on a showing of danger of irreparable
56. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
57. Another prerequisite to federal jurisdiction is that the case arise under federal law,
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). While all of the cases discussed in this section
meet this requirement, the Court's construction of the statute exhibits the instability that
characterizes so much of federal courts doctrine. Compare American Wellworks Co. v. Layne
Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916) (a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action,
so that a defamation case based on defendants' impugning the plaintiff's patent must be heard
in state court, even though a federal question (the validity of the patent) is presented on the
face of the complaint) with Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (a
suit arises under federal law if the complaint indicates a need to resolve a federal question).
The most recent case bearing on this issue is Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804 (1986), where the Court appeared to revert to American Wellworks, although it
claimed not to overrule Smith. See P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SAPMIRo, HART
& WESCrtLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1020 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
HART & WESCHtLER]. See also Field, supra note 7, at 687-90 (discussing the difficulty in
identifying the proper test to determine federal question jurisdiction).
58. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:358-14:378 (West Cum. Supp. 1962); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:396-14:3908 (West Cum. Supp. 1962).
59. 1900 Ky. McChord Act, ch. 2, p.5.
60. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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injury 'both great and immediate."' 6' The burdens of facing a state criminal
prosecution were not sufficient to meet this standard. Federal relief would
be appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances, as where the prosecution
was brought in bad faith, for the purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff,
and with no possibility of obtaining a valid conviction.
62
In the 1960's civil rights workers found themselves threatened with pros-
ecution under state statutes prohibiting subversive advocacy. They sought to
challenge the validity of those statutes in federal court on first amendment
grounds. In Dombrowski v. Pfister,63 the Court relaxed the restrictions on
access to federal courts so that more of these suits could be maintained in
federal court. Dombrowski held that the "irreparable injury" requirement
would be met if the federal plaintiff could prove that the state statute was
overbroad in violation of the first amendment. In such a case, "[tihe
assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample
vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded," since the broad sweep of
the statute and the consequent fear of prosecution may dissuade people from
ever exercising their rights in the first place.64
The effect of Dombrowski was to greatly increase the number of such
suits filed in the federal courts. 65 Although this case was part of the Warren
Court's expansion of constitutional remedies, it is not an example of the
Court flouting precedent. Rather, Dombrowski accepts the authority of
Douglas v. City of Jeanette for the proposition that federal injunctive relief
is generally unavailable against a state criminal prosecution, absent some
special circumstance such as bad faith.6 Douglas made no ruling on the
question of whether overbreadth could count as "irreparable injury." The
overbreadth doctrine was still in its infancy at the time of Douglas.
67
61. Id. at 163-64 (citing Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935)).
62. See, e.g., Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941) (the Court found danger
of irreparable injury in the threat of multiple prosecutions and the risk that aggregate fines
that might be imposed would be very large). See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-
49 (1971) (single prosecution not brought in bad faith is incidental to criminal proceedings and
individual is not entitled to equitable relief).
63. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. Id. at 486.
65. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance
of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REv. 535, 606 (1970).
66. This broad reading of Douglas may have ascribed more authority to the case than it
deserved. A number of respected scholars maintain that Douglas itself "did not represent a
settled view against the issuance of injunctions in this context and that in fact such injunctions
had routinely been issued by lower courts and approved by the Supreme Court." P. Low & J.
JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1162 (2d ed. 1989)
[hereinafter P. Low & J. JEFFIES] (citing Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions:
The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 636 (1979); Soifer & Macgill, The Younger
Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1141 (1977); Wechsler, Federal
Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (1974)).
67. According to Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 11, the "fountainhead"
of the overbreadth doctrine is Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (where peaceful labor
picketing was construed to be speech and thus protected by the first amendment).
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Douglas and Dombrowski are important to our inquiry into precedent in
federal courts cases because they provide background to Younger v. Harris.6"
Just six years after Dombrowski, a new majority on the Court repudiated
the "overbreadth as irreparable injury" holding of that case. The Younger
Court began its treatment of Dombrowski by suggesting that it was of
minimal precedential value.69 Justice Black, writing for the Court, pointed
out that the overbreadth discussion in Dombrowski was "unnecessary to the
decision" of the earlier case, because the plaintiffs had also alleged a bad
faith prosecution and thus fell within "the long established standards. ' 70
This effort to weaken the precedential force of Dombrowski would be
persuasive if the overbreadth holding in that case were an ill-considered
afterthought that had produced unintended consequences. But the truth is
to the contrary. The Dombrowski majority deliberately sought to broaden
access to the federal courts by expanding the content of "irreparable in-
jury."' 7' Many litigants took advantage of the overbreadth exception created
by Dombrowski, and before Younger the Supreme Court never murmured
a word of protest. 72
To his credit, Justice Black devoted more attention to a forthright rejection
of Dombrowski on the merits. The chilling effect on protected speech alleged
in Younger could not "be satisfactorily eliminated by federal injunctive
relief."73 In addition, "the existence of a 'chilling effect,' even in the area
of first amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in
and of itself, for prohibiting state action." 74 Furthermore, facial review of
state statutes "is fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal
courts in our constitutional plan." ' 7' We need not pause to take sides in this
debate over the merits of Dombrowski. The point is that Younger is a frank
rejection of the earlier decision, based on the later Court's disagreement
with its wisdom.
2. Procedural Default in Habeas Corpus
Younger denies access to federal court where a state action is pending at
trial or on appeal. When a defendant has exhausted his appeals in the state
courts, he may become a federal plaintiff in a habeas corpus action seeking
release from custody. The statute granting federal habeas corpus to state
prisoners dates from 1867. Over the years the Court has varied its treatment
of virtually every aspect of habeas, including the grounds on which habeas
68. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
69. Id. at 50.
70. Id.
71. See Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1112-13, 1163 (1977).
72. See P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, supra note 66, at 1162.
73. 401 U.S. at 50.
74. Id. at 51.
75. Id. at 52.
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may be sought, 76 the definition of "custody, '"77 and the extent to which the
habeas petitioner must exhaust state remedies.7 1 Perhaps the best illustration
of the Court's treatment of precedent, is its changing doctrine on procedural
default.
A state prisoner may not assert federal constitutional claims on habeas
unless he has properly preserved them in state court or has a good excuse
for not having done so.79 If a valid state procedural rule requires a contem-
poraneous objection to the admission of evidence, the prisoner who neglects
to object may be barred from raising the constitutional validity of the
evidence on habeas.8 0 And the prisoner who inexcusably fails to appeal a
trial court's ruling on a constitutional defense in state court, within the
state's deadlines, will not be permitted to raise the issue on habeas.8 '
The hard question here is determining what constitutes a good excuse. In
the 1953 case Daniels v. Allen,82 the Court reaffirmed a long-standing rule
that virtually no excuse was good enough, unless the state itself was to blame
for the problem. 3 In Daniels, for example, a state prisoner was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. The prisoner's lawyer served the appeal
by hand in state court a day after the deadline for mailing it.4 Although
this violation of state procedure seems unimportant, the Supreme Court
denied federal habeas consideration of his constitutional claims.8"
Ten years later the Warren Court returned to this issue. The habeas
petitioner in Fay v. Noia 6 had been convicted twenty years earlier and had
failed to file an appeal in state court, 87 yet the Court granted him access to
76. Compare Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (generally permitting accused to habeas
corpus for constitutional claims) with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denying habeas
for most fourth amendment claims). See also Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1068 (1989)
(following cause and prejudice test); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (habeas
denied after application of cause and effect test).
77. Compare Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942) (habeas unavailable to petitioner on
parole) with Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1963) (parole is sufficient restraint
to constitute "custody" and authorize habeas). See generally HART & WESCHLER, supra note
57, at 1020.
78. Compare Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiring exhaustion of all claims
presented in a habeas petition before a federal court should consider any of them) with Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 684 (1984) (considering the merits of an exhausted claim even though
the petitioner had also presented an unexhausted one). See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 80-81 (1977) (exception to contemporaneous objection rule exists upon showing cause for
noncompliance and actual prejudice).
79. See Hill, The Forfeiture of Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1050 (1978).
80. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
81. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
82. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (decided in the same opinion as Brown v. Allen).
83. Id. at 482-87.
84. Id. at 552-53.
85. Id.
86. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
87. Id. at 394.
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federal habeas."8 Under the rule laid down in Noia, procedural default would
preclude habeas only where the petitioner's conduct amounted to a "delib-
erate bypass" of state processes.8 9 While the Court never identified the
precise contours of this standard, it was clear that errors by the criminal
defendant's lawyer would not bar access to habeas. In justifying the new
rule, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court sets forth an ambitious theory
of habeas as a remedy that focuses on the basic justice of the incarceration,
and makes extensive use of historical materials. 90 But the opinion barely
mentions Daniels and does not explain why the case deserves no precedential
weight.9'
In the 1970's Noia went to the grave along with Flast and Dombrowski.
In Francis v. Henderson92 and Wainwright v. Sykes,93 the Burger Court
replaced the "deliberate bypass" standard with a "cause and prejudice" test
for procedural default.9 4 Under this new standard, a habeas petitioner may
be barred not only by his counsel's deliberate choice to bypass state proce-
dures, but also by the lawyer's unintentional errors. 95 Habeas is available
only when the default is due to an inability to raise the federal issue, as
where the constitutional right asserted was not established until after the
trial, or where the state is to blame for the default.
In Sykes the Court gave Noia a somewhat more respectful burial than
Justice Brennan had accorded Daniels. Justice Rehnquist began his discussion
of Noia with a wholly unconvincing attempt to narrow its reach to the
failure to appeal context in which it arose. According to the Court in Sykes,
the application of the "deliberate bypass" standard outside that context to
the contemporaneous objection rule at issue in Sykes can be traced not to
the holding in Noia but merely to "dicta. ' 96 The problem raised by this
effort to evade Noia's precedential force is that the reasoning of Noia, as
88. Id. at 441.
89. Id. at 438.
90. 372 U.S. at 399-435.
91. Id. at 424-25.
92. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
93. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
94. See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496-97 (1986) ("The cause and prejudice test
as interpreted. . . in our decision today is, we think, a sound and workable means of channelling
the discretion of federal habeas courts."); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986)
("application of the cause and prejudice test will not result in a 'fundamental miscarriage of
justice."' (citing Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982))); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984)
("When ... a defendant has failed to abide by a state's procedural rule requiring the exercise
of legal expertise and judgment, the competing concerns implicated by the exercise of the
federal court's habeas corpus power have come to be embodied in the cause and prejudice
requirement."); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982) ("We believe the proper
standard of review . . . is the 'cause and actual prejudice' standard."); Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S.
107, 135 (1982) ("we are confident that victims of the fundamental miscarriage of justice will
meet the cause and prejudice standard.").
95. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 485-87.
96. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
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well as the "deliberate bypass" rule, were cast in broad terms in order to
cover all procedural defaults. The Supreme Court, as well as lower courts,
had so understood the case for over a decade. 97
The Sykes opinion does not end with this clumsy effort to dodge Noia.
As Justice Black did in Younger, Justice Rehnquist went on to confront the
"deliberate bypass" test on its merits. He and the new majority deemed the
state interests underlying state forfeiture rules worthy of "greater respect"9
than Noia gave them. A contemporaneous objection rule "enables the record
to be made ... when the recollections of the witnesses are freshest.'' 99
Further, it "enables the judge who observed the demeanor of those witnesses
to make the factual determinations necessary for properly deciding the federal
constitutional question," and, in general, it makes "a major contribution
to finality in criminal litigation.' °0
D. Supreme Court Review of Ambiguous State Judgments
Since "[flederal law ... rarely occupies a legal field completely, totally
excluding all participation by the legal systems of the states," 0 , many disputes
present some issues of federal law and others that turn on state law.
Consequently, state courts often must resolve both state and federal ques-
tions. Ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789,102 Congress has authorized the
Supreme Court to review at least some of these state cases. The Court
decided long ago that it would hear only the federal issues decided by state
courts, and not matters governed by state law. 03 It will refuse to consider
even the federal issues if an adequate and independent state ground supports
the judgment, so that resolution of the federal issue would not affect the
outcome of the case.' ° Under this test, if a state court strikes down state
legislation on both federal and state grounds, then the state ground is
adequate and the loser cannot appeal to the Supreme Court. By contrast,
the state ground is not adequate if the state court upholds the legislation
against both challenges, for then a different resolution of the federal issue
would change the outcome of the case.
Difficulties arise in the application of this test when the state court's
opinion is ambiguous. This problem typically arises when the state consti-
97. See Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1683, 1685 (1979); Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults by
Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341, 344-50 (1978).
98. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 88-90. The Court later decided to abandon Noia in the context of failure to
appeal as well. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-92 (1986).
101. HART & WESCHtER, supra note 57, at 533.
102. 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789).
103. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
104. E.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Broad River Power Co. v.
South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1930).
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tution contains provisions paralleling those of the Bill of Rights, such as the
due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Someone chal-
lenges state action in state court on both state and federal grounds and the
state court cites both state and federal authority in disapproving the state's
conduct. Whether the Supreme Court can review the state court judgment
depends on whether the state court meant to ground its decision in state or
federal law, yet it is not clear what the state court really meant to do.
There are just four ways of dealing with ambiguous state opinions, and
at one time or another the Supreme Court has tried each of them. Early in
its history the Court took the view that it was up to the appellant to
demonstrate the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Under this approach, the
presumption was that the state court judgment rested on state grounds unless
there were persuasive reasons to conclude otherwise. 05 If the state opinion
was too ambiguous to provide such reasons, the Court denied review. As
early as 1890, in Johnson v. Risk,'0o the Court adopted a second approach.
Under this approach, the Supreme Court itself examined state law to deter-
mine whether a decision rested on state grounds. While the Court has
continued to employ this method on occasion, it seems to carry no prece-
dential force, for the Court also adopts a third approach, that of sending
the case back to state court for clarification. 10 7
Until the 1980's the Court "oscillated among . . . these alternatives."'' 0 s
Then in Michigan v. Long, 109 it declared that none of them were satisfactory.
Presuming an adequate state ground would sometimes mean that decisions
based on federal law go unreviewed." 0 The Court may err if it examines
unfamiliar state law for itself."' And sending cases back to state court
"places significant burdens on the state courts" and creates "delay and
decrease in efficiency of judicial administration." 2 Hence, all three of these
techniques were discarded. In their place, the Court erected a presumption
that, absent a clear statement to the contrary by the state court, state opinions
including both state and federal authorities are presumed to rest on federal
grounds. In justifying the new rule, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
105. See, e.g., Lynch v. New York ex reL Pierson, 293 U.S. 52 (1934); Eustis v. Bolles, 150
U.S. 361 (1893); Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257 (1871).
106. 137 U.S. 300, 307 (1890). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 732-33 n.l (1983)
(plurality opinion) (the decision below reversing defendant's narcotics conviction did not rest
on an adequate and independent state ground but on a Supreme Court ruling and Texas cases
interpreting that ruling); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1982) (the opinion below
reversing defendant's conviction on double jeopardy grounds rested solely on federal law).
107. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972) (per curiam); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117
(1945); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
108. HART & WESCHLER, supra note 57, at 548.
109. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
110. Id. at 1040 ("there is an important need for uniformity in federal law, and this need
goes unsatisfied when we fail to review an opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds.").
111. See id. at 1039 ("The process of examining state law is unsatisfactory because it requires
us to interpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar .
112. Id. at 1039-40.
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Court stressed the importance of achieving uniformity of federal law. 1 3 The
Long rule, unlike the contrary presumption, would assure Supreme Court
review of any state case that may turn on federal law.
Perhaps it is too late for me to offer the Court's treatment of ambiguous
state grounds as an example of instability in the law of federal courts. The
Long opinion deplores the "ad hoc method" of the earlier cases, which "is
antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive issues
of federal-state relations are involved. 1 1 4 So the Court reexamines the
problem and comes up with a new rule "in order to achieve the consistency
that is necessary."'1 5 Permit me to be skeptical. Long may stand for a
hundred years and prove me wrong, but the history of the Court's efforts
in this area do not augur well for it. The Court has already (arguably)
departed from it once. In Capital Cities Media v. Toole," 6 the state court
did not write an opinion, and both federal and state grounds were available
for disposition of the case. Rather than apply the Long presumption, the
Court preferred to remand to the state court for guidance." 7
II. THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Why is precedent such a weak constraint in federal courts law? To answer
this question it is necessary to construct a model of the role of stare decisis
in the legal system, and then to explore the implications of the model for
precedent in the federal courts context. This part of the Article undertakes
the first inquiry, and Part III the second.
A. Precedent and Judicial Decisionmaking
We may clarify the role of precedent in adjudication by distinguishing
between two reasons why a court might cite to a prior decision. On the one
hand, a judge might think the earlier opinion will reinforce his own argu-
ments, either because the reasoning is highly persuasive, or because the judge
who wrote the opinion is highly regarded, or because many cases have
reached the same result on the issue at hand, so that the sheer weight of
numbers falls on one side of the question. The deciding court does not in
any of these instances advance the earlier opinion as a precedent for the
resolution of the case before it. By hypothesis, the court has reasoned its
way to an answer based on its conception of fairness or good social policy
or some other norm, and now employs earlier cases to bolster its explanation
of the result.
This is not to suggest, however, that such citations are mere window
dressings. Perhaps the judges themselves made up their minds only after
113. See id. at 1040-41.
114. Id. at 1039.
115. Id.
116. 466 U.S. 378 (1984) (per curiam). See HART & WESCHLER, supra note 57, at 552.
117. 466 U.S. at 379.
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reading the earlier opinions and finding them to be persuasive. What must
be underlined is that the primary source of the court's holding in such a
case is the majority's conception of good law. The authorities are of sec-
ondary importance, valuable only because of the contribution they make to
realizing the deciding court's own aims. " ' When cases are used in this way,
their pedigree is less important than their substantive content. A dissenting
opinion, a ruling from another jurisdiction, or from a lower court, may
prove just as useful as the court's own cases.
Contrast this use of past decisions with the case where a court rules as it
does just because of the existence of the prior case." 9 Now the cited case
counts solely because it was decided by a court with ultimate authority over
the matter at issue, and not at all because of the persuasiveness of the
reasoning in the opinion or the number of cases from lower courts or other
jurisdictions reaching the same result. Moreover, it is irrelevant whether the
present court shares the conception of justice underlying the earlier opinion
or endorses the earlier court's reasoning. Only if these conditions are met
has the present court truly invoked the earlier case as a precedent.
The point of this distinction between two ways of using cases is that stare
decisis is not a rhetorical or persuasive device. It is nothing less than a rule
of decision. Precedent plays the same role in adjudication as do statutory
and constitutional commands, the principle of utility, and various concep-
tions of justice and morality, all of which are standards upon which judges
explicitly or implicitly rely in deciding cases. In a regime where precedent
counts heavily, the prior case, by itself and unadorned with arguments from
utility or fairness or statutory text, is a sufficient justification for a court's
resolution of the current dispute.
Notice two corollaries of this reasoning. First, in such a system precedent
governs even though the present court, left to its own devices, would rule
otherwise. Second, like other rules of decision, nothing in the nature of stare
decisis requires that a court must either follow precedent religiously or not
at all. Like utility or fairness, precedent can influence outcomes more or
less heavily even when it is not the decisive factor in all cases where precedents
are available. A court may, in a given case, find that other considerations
outrank precedent without abandoning its commitment to take precedent
into account in reaching decisions.120
Whether courts in practice give much weight to precedent is a separate
question. Precedent has had a checkered career in Western legal systems.
Given the austerity required of a court that follows stare decisis, some
commentators would banish precedent from the judicial arsenal altogether.' 2'
118. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 575.
119. Id. at 576; R. WASSERSTROM, THE JuDmciAL DECISION 54 (1961).
120. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 592.
121. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW ArrND THE MODERN MIND 167 (Anchor ed. 1963).
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In the early common law precedent counted for little,'22 and in modern civil
law countries with detailed codes, only the code is considered law. The
decisions of courts are merely efforts to interpret and apply the code cor-
rectly. If a later court thinks an earlier tribunal erred, it is supposed to
ignore the prior decision.123
At the other extreme, the British House of Lords announced, at the end
of the nineteenth century, that it would consider itself absolutely bound to
follow its precedents. 124 Only in this way, it was argued, could the law be
certain and judges stopped from usurping the powers of the legislature. 125
Likewise, some American courts write as if precedent is rigidly binding upon
them, especially when they are about to reject a plea for overturning a rule
widely perceived as unjust. 126 Modern scholarly commentary supporting this
approach to precedent is hard to come by.
Most courts adopt a third stance toward stare decisis, in between these
two. They accord weight to precedent, but they sometimes overrule or
undermine precedents they consider sufficiently unworthy. There is a wide
spectrum of approaches within this group of courts. While all of them pay
attention to precedent, some give it more respect than others. Variations
aside, today this is the prevalent view, in practice if not in theory, in both
common law and civil law countries. 27 In 1966, the House of Lords aban-
doned its rigid rule and joined this group. 28 Observers of practices in civil
law systems report that lines of precedent, if not specific cases, receive
respect in the decision of later cases, even where judicial decisions have no
official status as law. 29
122. See J. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 58 (1968).
123. See J. MERRYMAN, THE CIvIL LAW TRADITION 36 (2d ed. 1985).
124. See J. DAWSON, supra note 122, at 91; London Street Tramways Co. v. London County
Council, 1898 App. Cas. 375, 380.
125. See J. DAWSON, supra note 122, at 92-93.
126. See, e.g., Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Or. 489, 493-94, 280 P.2d
301, 303 (1955). "Some courts of high repute . .. have [re-examined the question of tort
liability as it applies to charitable institutions] and in many instances have, in light of changed
conditions, overturned the rule of immunity, expressly overruling their prior decisions .... We
also suggested a change in the rule .... " Id. at 302-03. Yet the court declined to overrule prior
case law stating, "it seems clear that any change in the public policy of this state should be a
matter solely for legislative determination." Id. at 302.
127. See R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 4 (3d ed. 1977) (regarding common law
countries); J. MERRYMAN, supra note 123, at 47 (regarding civil law countries). See also Moore,
A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279, 372 (1985) (discounting in
general the two extremes accorded precedent, namely absolute weight or no weight for stare
decisis).
128. See 3 All E.R. 77 (1966) (note by the House of Lords); R. CRoss, supra note 127, at
109.
129. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH & V. MOZOLIN, CONTRACT LAW IN THE USSR AND THE
UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND GENERAL CONCEPT 99-100 (1987); 1 F. LAWSON & B. MARKESINIS,
TORTIOUS LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 186
(1982).
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What accounts for the dominant position of this third approach? Two
propositions should already be apparent. First, there must be powerful
considerations operating in favor of following precedent, else it is quite
impossible to understand why judges in so many times and places would
follow previous cases instead of implementing their own notions about what
rules are best. Second, absolute or even nearly absolute fidelity to precedent
is hardly a requisite of a healthy legal system. While federal courts law seems
especially unstable, all lawyers know that virtually no area of the law goes
very long without some judicial modification. But we have not yet explored
the reasons why courts move toward the middle and away from the two
extreme positions on the role of precedent in adjudication.
B. The Costs and Benefits of Precedent as a Rule of Decision
Precedent is best understood in instrumental terms as a tool that produces
a number of benefits and obliges us to bear significant costs. The disagree-
ments among courts and commentators over whether stare decisis should
count at all and how much weight it should receive reflect differences over
the value of these benefits and costs. The general rejection of both extreme
positions demonstrates that nearly everyone agrees there is something of
value on either side of the cost-benefit equation.
1. The Value of Precedent
a. Stability
Precedent promotes stability in the law. 3' The link between precedent and
stability is straightforward: the law will change less over time to the extent
judges feel a strong obligation to adhere to prior cases even when their own
preference is to replace the old rule. But why is a stable body of law a goal
worth pursuing? We must consider this question in abstract terms, apart
from specific rules or proposals for reform. Otherwise, we may be distracted
by the merits of particular rules and lose sight of the question of whether
stability deserves respect for its own sake in judicial decisionmaking.
Quite apart from the content of any given rule, the value of stability in
the law is rooted in two distinct considerations, one psychological and the
other economic. On the level of human psychology, "[olne of the most
fundamental of all human needs is to feel in control of one's environment."' 3'
This urge "can be best satisfied .. .in an environment in which change-
if it occurs at all-is regular and therefore can be anticipated."' 3 Since legal
rules have important effects on human welfare, they must remain reasonably
stable if people are to feel at ease. Absent a major alteration in human
130. See R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 119, at 60-62; Schauer, supra note 23, at 597.
131. R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 119, at 62.
132. Id.
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nature, legal systems will always respond to this desire for control by giving
weight to prior cases.
Even if human beings felt no strong psychological need for stability, a
powerful argument can be made for stability in the law on economic grounds.
People cannot be induced to voluntarily give up the maximization of current
satisfactions, and instead invest in the future, unless they can be reasonably
confident that they or their heirs will gain from the increase in wealth
produced by the investment. Unless legal rules in areas such as contracts
and property remain stable, no one can have any confidence that he will be
able to capture the fruits of his investment. In the long run, we will be
poorer. 3 3 Take the simple case of a woman thinking about planting a garden.
If the law regarding property rights were unstable, she would fear that by
the time the vegetables were ready to pick, the law of property may allow
her neighbors to take them. As a result, she would have far less incentive
to plant and nurture the garden, foregoing the chance to create more wealth
for herself and for society as a whole.
b. Reliance
Once a court has established stare decisis as a rule of decision, people
may come to rely on predictions that the court will abide by precedent.
Indeed, the point of the economic ground for stability in law is to induce
such reliance. In turn, reliance generates another reason for continued ad-
herence to precedent. Putting aside the psychological need for control and
the utilitarian goal of stimulating investment for the future, basic notions
of fairness counsel against betraying people who are induced to arrange their
affairs in a certain way by assurances that the court follows precedent.134
Suppose a telegraph company, knowing of the rule that limits contractual
liability for consequential damages, and knowing the courts' practice of
following precedent, takes no precautions to ensure that its messages are
accurately transmitted. Though doubting the substantive merits of this rule
on consequential damages, the court in Kerr Steamship Co. v. Radio Corp.
of America3' thought that reliance upon it was a compelling justification
for adhering to precedent.
Notice that reliance, unlike stability, is not a justification for instituting
a practice of following precedent. 36 Reliance does not come into play until
the courts have established stare decisis as a rule of decision, and people
have observed it in operation long enough to draw the inference that prec-
133. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); M. EISENBERG,
supra note 24, at 10-11, 48, 63, 96; R. POSNER, EcoNoMwc ANALYSIS OF LAW 30-33 (3d ed.
1986); R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 119, at 61-62.
134. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 48-49; R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 119, at 66-
69.
135. 245 N.Y. 284, 291, 157 N.E. 140, 142 (1927).
136. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 48-49; R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 119, at 68-
69.
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edent will count heavily in adjudication. In this respect, reliance is dependent
on the stability argument. It seems appropriate to treat it separately, however,
since precedent is now well established in our legal system. As the system
has evolved over time, fairness has emerged as a distinct factor counseling
fidelity to precedent, even if stability were not important for its contribution
to psychological ease and investment in the future.
c. Efficiency
Judges never have enough time to examine every issue as thoroughly as
they would like. Given the amount of work they must do, and the importance
of having cases decided within a reasonable period of time, it is wise for
them to husband their scarce resources and devote them to the matters that
most demand careful attention, such as important questions that the court
has not yet addressed. It makes sense from the standpoint of the efficient
use of judicial resources to count the court's prior consideration and decision
on an issue as a good reason to follow that earlier case instead of looking
once again at the merits of the competing arguments.' a
This mundane maxim of good judicial housekeeping may seem insignifi-
cant, and it likely counts for little when the precedent at hand concerns a
question of vital importance, as is the case with many constitutional issues.
However, "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right."' 38 Often the gains from directing
more judicial resources to an issue will not be worth the benefits.
2. The Opportunity Cost of Precedent
If following precedent efficiently utilizes scarce judicial resources, pro-
motes needed stability in the law, and treats fairly those who rely on that
stability, then why not regard precedent as the primary rule of decision,
absolutely binding on the courts, as the British House of Lords did between
1898 and 1966? The reason is that these benefits must be purchased at a
significant price, and the cost may be more than a court is willing to pay.
The whole point of precedent is to remove from the deciding court the
chance to reconsider the merits of the issue at hand, in the hope of arriving
at a better resolution from the perspective of morality, or utility, or some
other standard. The cost of adherence to precedent, then, is the foregone
opportunity to try to make the law better by reexamining the reasoning of
the earlier cases. 39
The worth of this lost opportunity may vary depending on a host of
circumstances. One variable is how important the question is. On crucial
matters of public law, the lost opportunity may be worth more than on
137. See R. POSNER, supra note 133, at 515; Schauer, supra note 23, at 599; R. WASSERSTROM,
supra note 119, at 72-73.
138. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
139. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 588-91.
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ordinary issues.140 Another variable is just how bad the earlier decision was.
The more harm it does, in the view of the deciding court, the greater is the
cost of refusing to reexamine it.' 41 Another important factor is the strength
of the court's commitment to judicial activism. A judge who perceives his
role primarily in terms of adjudicating disputes under the standing law will
be less inclined to depart from precedent than one who views legal reform
as a major part of the judicial role. 42 The distinction here is not between
political liberals and conservatives. Many conservative judges seem to be as
committed to legal reform as the members of the liberal Warren Court. 143
Finally, "reliance on precedent is inherently risk averse."' 44 This factor
goes not to the merit of the old rule or to the judicial philosophy of judges,
but to the judges' personalities. Judges who are confident of their ability to
make the law better will more often prove willing to spurn precedent than
pessimists who fear that, however bad the old rule, the proposed new one
may be even worse.
III. PRECEDENT IN CONTEXT: FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVISITED
Discussions of precedent typically go no further than identifying the costs
and benefits of stare decisis in general terms. They may point out that the
costs and benefits of stare decisis can vary according to context, so that
precedent may be a stronger constraint in some contexts than others.' 4 But
they do not address specific contexts in any detail. For example, Professor
Schauer's recent and insightful article1 46 demonstrates that "no argument
from invariable principle supports either the argument from predictability
or the argument from enhanced decisionmaking."'' 47 Consequently, "the
140. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (the issue was important enough to
the public interest that the Court overruled precedent and held government appeals from
midtrial dismissals requested by the defendant did not violate the double jeopardy rule).
141. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 104-05, 122.
142. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1923
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Armstrong, Mr. Justice Douglas on Stare Decisis: A
Condensation of the Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 35 A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1949) ("Justices who in
their private practice had to advise clients with large property interests have been the strongest
adherents to stare decisis and former legislators and schoolmen are least influenced by it"
(footnote omitted)); Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 741 n.108 (1988) ("some writers have thought that the background of members of
the Court has contributed importantly to attitudes towards precedent").
143. See, e.g., Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 495-96 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (questioning the authority of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890));
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(calling for a future majority to overrule the Court's decision); Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453-59 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning the
authority of some aspects of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
144. Schauer, supra note 23, at 590. See also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1923 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 12, 121-22; Schauer, supra note 23, at 598.
146. Schauer, supra note 23, at 600.
147. Id.
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evaluation of these alternatives turns into a weighing of costs and benefits
that varies with different decisionmaking settings," and "[flurther elabora-
tion must be relegated to discussions of the goals to be served and the
characteristics of decisionmaking in various decisionmaking settings."1 48
This part of the Article is a response to Professor Schauer's call for more
attention to context.1 49 It focuses on the law of federal courts and argues
that precedent is a relatively weak constraint here because the benefits of
adhering to precedent are comparatively low and the costs are high. A
distinctive feature of the law of federal courts is that it addresses questions
pertaining to the distribution of power among governmental institutions and
not, as in most areas of doctrine, the substantive rights and obligations of
persons toward one another and the government. These matters are as
important to the character and vitality of our polity as they are irrelevant
to the practical affairs of life. Because people typically do not count on
stability in jurisdictional rules as they go about managing their lives and
businesses, the value of precedent is low here, At the same time, the issues
raised by these cases present the Court with occasions to realize a number
of policy objectives. The Justices find it difficult to forego these opportunities
for the sake of respecting precedent.
A. The Low Value of Precedent in Federal Courts Law
Just as stare decisis serves as a tool for maintaining a stable body of law,
so also stability in the law is a means toward three more basic ends: 1)
satisfying the psychological need for control over one's environment; 2)
encouraging investment in the future; and, 3) efficiently allocating scarce
judicial resources. Once the practice of following precedent is established,
fairness to persons who act in reliance upon it also demands adherence to
prior cases. While efficiency would be served by adherence to precedent in
all doctrinal contexts, the other justifications for precedent vary in strength
from one area of the law to another. The psychological, economic, and
fairness considerations that give stability its value are less important in some
contexts than others. Where stability is less vital, the benefits from fidelity
to precedent are lower, and the cost-benefit calculus is more likely to come
out against following the earlier case.
In order to measure the value of stare decisis in federal courts law, it is
necessary to distinguish between primary rules, which "are concerned with
the actions that individuals must or must not do,"' 50 and secondary rules
which "specify the ways in which the primary rules may be ascertained,
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively
determined."'' All of the bodies of law governing activity in daily life-
148. Id. at 600-01.
149. Id. at 603-05.
150. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (1961).
151. Id.
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contracts, torts, property, crime, and the like-are groups of primary rules.
Federal courts cases like Younger,' Pennhurst, "I Valley Forge,'i and Long'
are of an entirely different order. These jurisdictional norms allocating cases
between federal and state courts, identifying who is an appropriate party to
litigate an issue, and specifying the circumstances under which the Supreme
Court may review a state court judgment are all secondary rules.
Stability counts heavily in the law governing primary activity, 1 6 and much
less in the rules distributing cases among courts, determining who has
standing, and setting standards for Supreme Court review. The Court's
assertion in Long that "doctrinal consistency ... is required when sensitive
issues of federal-state relations are involved"' 517 does not withstand scrutiny.
The psychological need for control over one's environment and the impor-
tance of predictability in planning for the future are both strong with respect
to the legal standards governing events of daily life in the world. It is
important to our well-being, that the rules on keeping to the right on the
highway and on property rights in one's house or car remain stable. No one
would loan money or otherwise invest in the future without some assurance
that current law protecting the investment would not change drastically.
And, once people have been induced to act in reliance upon precedent in
ordering their primary activity, it is unfair to betray their reliance by breaking
with precedent.
In contrast, most people pay little if any attention to jurisdictional rules
in deciding how to comport themselves and deploy their resources in the
world of primary activity." They do not decide how much care to take, or
whether to sign a contract, or whether to exercise their putative first amend-
ment rights, based on whether any litigation that might arise will go .to
federal or state court,'5 9 or whether the Supreme Court will be able to review
152. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
153. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
154. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
155. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
156. Even here, stability may be more important in some doctrinal contexts than others. See
M. EISENBERO, supra note 24, at 122 (for example, areas "in which planning on the basis of
law is common," like property law).
157. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039.
158. Cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) ("The confidence
of people in their ability to predict the legal consequences of their actions is vitally necessary
to facilitate the planning of primary activity .... However, that confidence is threatened least
by the announcement of a new remedial rule to effectuate well-established primary rules of
behavior."). See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("The choice of the Federal Rule would have no effect on the primary stages of private activity
from which torts arise, and only the most minimal effect on behavior following the commission
of the tort.").
159. Under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal courts were not
obliged to follow state common law rules, and the choice of forum could indeed determine the
rights of the parties. Id. at 6-7. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 529-31 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The
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an ambiguous state judgment. These jurisdictional rules come into play only
after a dispute has arisen and threatens to give rise to litigation.
The point here is not that jurisdictional rules have absolutely no impact
on the outcomes of cases. On the contrary, it seems to me quite evident that
federal courts' rulings have significant, if indirect, effects on the results of
litigation, and hence on the content of primary rules establishing the sub-
stantive rights and duties of the parties. 60 For example, litigants asserting
first amendment rights are more likely to succeed if their cases are heard in
federal court because federal courts are, on the whole, more sympathetic to
constitutional claims than state courts. 61 But few people do look ahead to
the jurisdictional issues that might arise in hypothetical future litigation, as
they engage in their daily affairs in the world of primary activity. 162
Recall the psychological, economic, and moral underpinnings of basing
decisions on precedent. The effort to diminish instability is worth pursuing
only to the extent people actually perceive that forces outside their control
have important consequences for them. For all we know the planet may be
in imminent danger of colliding with an undiscovered asteroid, but so long
as no one knows about the hazard, no one is much troubled by the instability
it introduces into our lives. Rules delineating the jurisdiction of federal and
state courts may well affect the outcomes of cases. Government officials
and individuals who engage in much constitutional litigation, and who
appreciate the substantive consequences of jurisdictional rules, may well
incur some of the harms that accompany unstable rules. This group, however,
constitutes only a small part of the population. So long as few of us perceive
the connection or think about the jurisdictional aspects of potential future
lawsuits when deciding how to act in the world of primary behavior, the
instability of federal courts rules will not engender significant amounts of
manifest unfairness engendered by this state of affairs was a major factor leading to the
downfall of Swift. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938).
160. See Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal Courts, 30 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 499, 516-18 (1989) (outlining courts' reasoning underlying federal jurisdictional
rules).
161. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-28 (1977) (evaluating
relative institutional capacity in terms of technical competence, psychological set and political
processes); Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 581, 611-
17 (1985) (viewing article III as creating specially empowered decisionmakers). See also Marvell,
The Rationales for Federal Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights
Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1315, 1353-64 (lawyers believe federal courts are more sympathetic
to constitutional claims); Wells, Habeas Corpus and Freedom of Speech, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1307,
1324, 1349-51 (finding a 44% success rate in reported cases over a fifteen year period for
habeas petitioners seeking to overturn state court convictions by raising first amendment
grounds).
162. 1 cannot prove the truth of this intuition. It is based on my observation of human
behavior. For example, laymen sometimes ask me what I do. When I describe my work as a
torts teacher, they take a lively interest, ask questions, and venture opinions. On the other
hand, when I talk about federal courts, their attention begins to wander and I get the feeling
they are sorry they asked.
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psychological unease, or unduly hinder efforts to plan ahead, or seriously
disappoint reliance interests. 63
The situation is sharply different once a dispute arises and someone
contemplates litigation. Lawyers certainly do rely on jurisdictional rules in
deciding whether a given dispute is justiciable, whether Supreme Court review
is available, and whether to file suit in state or federal court. Yet the lawyer's
interest in stable jurisdictional rules differs significantly from our common
desire for stable rules governing primary behavior. Although changing the
jurisdictional rules in the course of a lawsuit would be disruptive and unfair,
the lawyer's need for predictability and stability is substantially satisfied
when he knows at the outset of a given piece of litigation what to expect.
It is critical that the rules governing this case remain stable, but not so vital
that jurisdictional rules stay the same from one case to the next.l6 Accord-
ingly, the lawyer's legitimate demand for stability can be met by prospective
application of any new jurisdictional rule, without incurring the substantial
costs in terms of inflexibility that accompany heavy reliance on stare decisis.' 61
B. The High Opportunity Cost of Precedent in the Federal Courts
Context
For the purpose of identifying the disadvantages of fidelity to precedent,
it is helpful to borrow from economics the concept of "opportunity cost."'
We can conceive of the cost of precedent in terms of the court's perception
of the value of the lost opportunity to change the law, or put another way,
the potential benefits of rethinking the issue at hand. Recall that the benefits
of rethinking an issue may vary from one case to another depending on such
factors as the importance of the issues at stake, the court's commitment to
law reform, and the judge's confidence in his ability to improve the law.
163. Moreover, since the law in this area has been unstable for some time, it is unlikely that
many governmental or private actors are induced to rely on precedent.
164. Efficiency argues for stability here as it does everywhere. But stability in federal courts
rules from one case to another is not necessary for psychological repose, or for investment in
the future, or to respect reliance.
165. An example may be helpful here. At one point in the development of the Pullman
abstention doctrine, the Court seemed to hold that litigants must present their federal claims
to the state court. Government & Civic Employees v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1957).
When the plaintiff in England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964),
followed this directive, and then tried to relitigate the federal issue in federal court, the Supreme
Court held that litigants were bound by state court determinations, unless they reserved their
rights to a federal court decision. This the plaintiff in England failed to do. Yet the Court
declined to apply its new rule to the plaintiff, since he had no way of knowing that a reservation
of rights was required. Id. at 422. Cf. O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593
F.2d 54, 64 (7th Cir. 1979) (dismissal of pendent state claims was abuse of discretion because
the statute of limitations, as amended, would render involuntary dismissals vulnerable to motions
to dismiss).
166. "Economic cost is described as 'opportunity cost' because the cost arises from the
foregone opportunities of the resources in question." M.J. BRENNAN, THEORY OF EcoNoMIc
STATISTICS 139 (2d ed. 1970).
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These benefits are greater in some doctrinal contexts than others, and they
are especially high in the law of federal courts.
One reason is that the law of federal courts addresses fundamental ques-
tions of separation of powers and federalism. It deals with the role of courts
in our system of government, their relations with the other branches, and
the distribution of power between federal and state courts. If on mundane
matters of private law it is often more important that an issue be settled,
than that it be settled correctly, the opposite is true with respect to basic
matters of governmental structure. Here it is often "more important that
things be settled correctly than that they be settled for the sake of settle-
ment.'"1 67
The most prominent application of this principle is the Supreme Court's
practice of according precedent comparatively little weight in constitutional
adjudication,1 61 partly because the issues are especially important and partly
because the Court's decisions on constitutional issues cannot easily be changed
by the other branches. Although some federal courts issues are themselves
of constitutional dimension, 69 the Court's special rule for constitutional
matters is hardly adequate by itself to account for the weakness of stare
decisis in federal courts law. Most federal courts questions are matters of
statutory interpretation 70 or common law rules,' 7' and yet precedent counts
for little throughout the area. One of the insights that may be gleaned from
167. Schauer, supra note 23, at 598. My claim is not that federal courts law is an especially
important area of the law from the perspective of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
possesses severely limited resources and an overwhelming demand for their use. Almost every
case the Court chooses to review is highly significant, and the critical nature of the issues may
count against stare decisis in virtually all of them. The relevant comparison here is between
federal courts law and the whole range of state and federal law.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) ("in cases involving the Federal
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court
has often overruled its earlier decisions." (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). In Scott, the Court overruled United States v.
Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1974), which held that the government had no right to an appeal,
whether or not a dismissal of an indictment after jeopardy had attached amounted to an
acquittal on the merits, because further procedure devoted to resolution of factual issues would
be required and that would offend the double jeopardy clause. Scott, 437 U.S. at 100-01. The
Scott Court held that an appeal by the government from a defendant's successful effort to
terminate his trial without any submission as to guilt or innocence does not offend the double
jeopardy clause. Id.
169. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (the
eleventh amendment bars state law suits against state officials).
170. Relevant statutes include, among others, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (Supreme Court review
of state judgments); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1982) (diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) (federal question removal); 28 U.S.C. §
1443 (1982) (civil rights removal); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (full faith and credit to state
judgments); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) (declaratory judgments); 28 U.S.C. § 2241-55 (1982) (post-
conviction relief); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (anti-injunction); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (civil
rights).
171. See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 570-74 (1985).
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a study of precedent in the federal courts context is that the importance of
the issues may be enough standing alone to weaken the force of stare decisis
.without the special problem of rigidity posed by constitutional rules.
Besides the importance of federal courts issues, other circumstances also
contribute to the high opportunity cost of precedent. If most members of
the Supreme Court were apolitical and skeptical of their ability to improve
the law, precedent might weigh heavily even on important federal courts and
constitutional issues. But neither of these conditions is met. Supreme Court
Justices have never been known for modesty or lack of self-confidence. A
lifetime of ambition and achievement is a virtual prerequisite for someone
seeking appointment to the Court. A candidate "must have proven himself
to have discernment in matters of complexity, steadiness in matters of
difficulty, and coolness in matters of controversy.' '1 72 The sort of person
who meets these criteria is not likely to shrink from repudiating or ignoring
cases he thinks are wrong.
Perhaps even the most self-assured Supreme Court Justice would shy away
from rethinking highly specialized areas of the law with which he is unfa-
miliar, like constitutional limits on state taxation, state boundary disputes,
and admiralty law. In contrast, the policy issues raised by federal courts
cases bear on the institutional role of the federal courts, and in particular
the Supreme Court, in our system of government. This is a topic to which
virtually every Supreme Court Justice, whatever his politics, will feel he
brings some expertise. From the perspective of judicial psychology, it must
be especially difficult for the members of the Court to let matters stand as
they are in the law of federal courts.13
Politics may be the most critical factor of all in explaining the doctrinal
instability in federal courts law. Over the past thirty years we have witnessed
two quite different majorities on the Court, both of them highly ideological
in character. The rise of the liberal Warren Court, soon followed by a more
conservative majority under Warren Burger, probably accounts for much of
the recent turmoil in federal courts doctrine. The ensemble of changes
brought about by the Court of the 1960's are not an ad hoc collection of
improvements in jurisdictional rules. They reflect a common ideological
theme, in which state sovereignty interests are weak and the federal courts
have a special mission to hold other branches of the government within
constitutional limits, and a far more prominent part than state courts in
enforcing constitutional rights against state governments. 74
In keeping with this expansive view of federal judicial power, the Warren
Court's departures from precedent, as well as its rulings on open questions,
172. Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21 (1978). '
173. Cf. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 846 (1988) ("1
predict a careful study would show that judges who know more about a particular field of law
are less deferential toward precedent than . . .judges who know less about the same field").
174. See Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1146-47, 1158-
64 (1988).
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helped to broaden access to the federal courts for persons with constitutional
claims. For instance, Flast'" broke down the Frothingham76 barrier to
litigating generalized grievances where an establishment clause violation is at
issue. The "deliberate bypass" test of Noia"7 relaxed the earlier rigorous
rule precluding federal habeas corpus when the petitioner's lawyer had
committed a procedural default in state court. Dombrowski178 opened the
federal courts to many suits seeking to enjoin state proceedings on consti-
tutional grounds.
Presidents Nixon and Reagan campaigned against the judicial activism of
the Warren Court. Most of their appointments, joined by Justice White,
combined in the 1970's and 1980's to form a majority for cutting back the
role of federal courts in adjudicating constitutional claims. The ideological
premises of the new majority are diametrically opposed to those of the
Warren Court. State sovereignty is considered a fundamental value, deserving
respect even when it conflicts with the effective enforcement of constitutional
rights, and the state courts should play at least as important a role as the
federal courts in adjudicating constitutional challenges to state action.179
Proceeding from these ideas about the role of the federal courts, the
Supreme Court in Valley Forge80 undercut Flast. 8' Sykes'a2 destroyed Noia'83
and Younger'8 4 shut the door opened by Dombrowski.'85 To be sure, Long'
18 6
175. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (permitting voters to
challenge legislative apportionment decisions).
176. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
177. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (relaxing
procedural default barriers to direct review by the Supreme Court of state judgments); Jones
v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (relaxing custody requirement for federal habeas corpus).
178. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
179. See Fallon, supra note 174, at 1146-47, 1151-57.
180. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
181. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
182. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (federal habeas
corpus petitioner cannot show cause for procedural default by establishing that counsel's failure
to raise a claim of action was inadvertent); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (petitioner
defaulted his underlying constitutional claim by failure to raise a claim of error on appeal).
183. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
184. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts will not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions
except to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury). See also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n
v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619, 628-29 (1986) (Court refused to enjoin Commission
from exercising its jurisdiction to investigate sex discrimination); Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 113 (1981) (principal of comity bars taxpayer's damage action
brought in federal court); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975) (federal judicial
interference principles apply in civil cases). But see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 638 (1980) (municipal governments have no immunity to section 1983 suits); Monell v.
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978) (municipal governments are "persons" who
may be sued under section 1983, overruling Monroe v. Pape, 361 U.S. 167 (1961), on this
issue).
185. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
186. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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broadened Supreme Court review, but the expansion helps the state far more
than the individual with a constitutional claim, since it applies mainly to
cases where the constitutional claimant won in state court. In such circum-
stances the primary beneficiary of Supreme Court review is the state, for
only the loser typically stands to gain much from appellate review."'
This description of political conflict in federal courts decisionmaking
borrows heavily from the work of Richard Fallon. 8 s Fallon demonstrates
convincingly that this area of the law is "wracked by internal contradictions" 8 9
and traces the problem to a conflict between competing views of proper
governmental structure, which he labels "Nationalist" and "Federalist."' 90
The work of the Warren Court, with its emphasis on the predominance of
national law and federal courts, manifests "Nationalist" premises, while the
Burger Court's stress on state sovereignty and a big role for state courts in
constitutional decisionmaking reflects "Federalist" thought. According to
Fallon, "the acceptance within federal courts law of antithetical starting
points for analysis gives rise to substantial doctrinal instability." '1 9,
Consider the import of Fallon's analysis for stare decisis. The doctrinal
schism Fallon describes cannot be due merely to disagreements between
judges about the best theoretical starting point for making jurisdictional
rules. In a regime where precedent mattered a great deal, the prior resolution
of an issue would itself be enough to overcome a judge's doubts about its
wisdom. The doctrinal instability Fallon elaborates in his article, and the
ideological divide he identifies between two sets of cases, strongly suggest
that the Justices place a low value on precedent in federal courts law, and
do so in part because reforming the content of the law, in pursuit of a
variety of political goals, is a more important agenda for them than furthering
the values of stability and efficiency that are served by adherence to prece-
dent.
CONCLUSION
My aim has been to describe and explain the instability that permeates
federal courts doctrine. Let me briefly address the normative issue. Does the
Court deserve criticism for its disregard of precedent? To what extent can
the explanations offered here serve to justify the Court's practice? Some of
the reasons identified in the foregoing discussion are less compelling than
others. In particular, the normative force of the considerations bearing on
the costs associated with adherence to precedent is problematic. If Supreme
Court Justices are unlikely to be humble, tend to think they can improve
187. See Wells, supra note 160, at 508-09.
188. See Fallon, supra note 174.
189. Id. at 1142.
190. For his descriptions of these two groups of premises, see Fallon, supra note 174, at
1151-64.
191. Id. at 1164.
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areas of the law with which they are familiar, and put ideological goals
above stability in the law, then we might be better off with a less assertive
and political Court. On the other hand, I am persuaded that the need for
stability is comparatively weak in doctrinal contexts where the rules do not
bear directly on primary activity. This feature of jurisdictional rules fatally
undercuts the case for more respect for precedent in federal courts law.
Bear in mind the difference between the justification of a practice and the
motivations of the actors who implement it. Supreme Court Justices who
accord precedent little weight may well be motivated primarily by their own
self-confidence or an ideological agenda or both. For them, there may be
nothing distinctive about the law of federal courts. Their practice in federal
courts cases may be merely one aspect of a general inclination against
precedent as a rule of decision. But the viability of a weak doctrine of
precedent does not rest solely on the motivations of judges. Even if we reject
judicial activism and the pursuit of ideological goals as persuasive justifi-
cations for the Court's practice, weak regard for precedent in federal courts
cases may still be defended in terms of the comparative unimportance of
stability in this doctrinal context.
Accordingly, it is useful to distinguish between the Court's lax doctrine
of precedent in constitutional cases and its disregard for stare decisis in
adjudicating federal courts matters. Whatever may be the proper general
approach to the former class of cases, the Court's treatment of the latter
can be defended by reference to peculiarities of the federal courts context.
A subordinate role for stare decisis is neither uncharacteristic of the history
of federal courts doctrine nor out of keeping with the role of precedent in
the legal order.
Note the implications of this conclusion for the future of federal courts
law. One day the composition of the Court will change, and with it the
Court's substantive agenda. A Court committed to expanding federal juris-
diction in order to better vindicate federal rights will have to deal with the
precedents left by the majorities of the 1970's and 1980's. If I am right
about the proper approach to precedent in federal courts cases, this hypo-
thetical future majority should feel few qualms about overruling or eviscer-
ating the current doctrine.
